Adversarial Attack on Hierarchical Graph Pooling Neural Networks by Tang, Haoteng et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
11
56
0v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
3 M
ay
 20
20
Adversarial Attack on Hierarchical
Graph Pooling Neural Networks
Haoteng Tang, Guixiang Ma, Yurong Chen, Lei Guo, Wei Wang, Bo Zeng, Liang Zhan
Abstract—Recent years have witnessed the emergence and
development of graph neural networks (GNNs), which have
been shown as a powerful approach for graph representation
learning in many tasks, such as node classification and graph
classification. The research on the robustness of these models
has also started to attract attentions in the machine learning
field. However, most of the existing work in this area focus on
the GNNs for node-level tasks, while little work has been done
to study the robustness of the GNNs for the graph classification
task. In this paper, we aim to explore the vulnerability of the
Hierarchical Graph Pooling (HGP) Neural Networks, which are
advanced GNNs that perform very well in the graph classification
in terms of prediction accuracy. We propose an adversarial attack
framework for this task. Specifically, we design a surrogate model
that consists of convolutional and pooling operators to generate
adversarial samples to fool the hierarchical GNN-based graph
classification models. We set the preserved nodes by the pooling
operator as our attack targets, and then we perturb the attack
targets slightly to fool the pooling operator in hierarchical GNNs
so that they will select the wrong nodes to preserve. We show
the adversarial samples generated from multiple datasets by our
surrogate model have enough transferability to attack current
state-of-art graph classification models. Furthermore, we conduct
the robust train on the target models and demonstrate that the
retrained graph classification models are able to better defend
against the attack from the adversarial samples. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work on the adversarial attack
against hierarchical GNN-based graph classification models.
Index Terms—Adversarial attacks, Hierarchical GNNs, Graph
Pooling, Graph Classification
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, deep convolutional neural network hasshown its outstanding performance in a variety of ma-
chine learning tasks. For example, the Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) has been widely used for image classifica-
tion [1], [2] and object detection [3]. Graph convolutional
neural network (GCN), as a generalized CNN for the non-grid-
like graph data, has also emerged as a powerful approach for
the graph representation learning in many tasks, such as node
classification [4]–[7] and edge prediction [8], [9]. There are
mainly two categories of graph convolutional neural networks:
spatial GCNs and spectral GCNs. The spectral GCNs take the
adjacency matrix of a graph and the node feature vectors as
input, and perform the convolutions based on graph Fourier
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Transform [10]–[12], while the spatial GCNs aggregates the
node representations from its neighborhood [13]–[15].
Recently, hierarchical Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), as
an advanced version of GCNs have been proposed for better
capturing the hierarchical structure of graphs, and they have
shown great advantage compared to the original GCNs for
the graph-level learning tasks, such as graph classification
and graph similarity analysis [16]–[21]. For instance, in [22],
GNNs with hierarchical graph pooling is proposed and applied
for the graph classification task, where the graph pooling
operation adaptively selects a subset of nodes to form an
induced subgraph, and a structure learning mechanism is
introduced for preserving the integrity of graph topological
information. In [23], hierarchical GNNs are developed for
the similarity learning between graphs for unknown malware
detection.
While the GNNs have made a great progress on the graph-
related tasks, the evaluation of the robustness of these neural
networks also becomes an important topic. Some recent works
have started to study the vulnerability of GNNs in node
classification tasks and have shown that, these models can
be attacked by the adversarial samples [24]–[31]. That is
to say, by introducing an unnoticeable perturbation from the
original graph, we can easily fool the GNNs to make a wrong
prediction result. For instance, Daniel Zugner et al. [32] design
a surrogate model to attack the GCN classification framework
for a specific node. Their model conducts a greedy search to
identify those attack candidate nodes, thereby generating the
adversarial graph by perturbing the candidate nodes’ features
and the connections between the candidate node and the target
node. After the attack, The GCN classifier will make a wrong
classification to the specific target. Dai Hanjun et al. [25]
provide another approach. They model the attack procedure
as a Finite Horizon Markow Decision Process and build up a
reinforcement learning framework to generate the adversarial
samples for attacking and evaluating the robustness of a family
of GCNs.
Despite the current work has made some progress in the
adversarial attack on GNNs, most of the attack tasks are on
the node level (e.g. node classification). The whole graph
classification is another valuable topic in various application
domains, such as the protein pattern classification based on
the amino acid networks, and the malware detection [23], etc.
Many recent studies [17], [19], [33] have started working on
the graph classification task using GNNs, in particular the
hierarchical GNNs which has been shown to be more powerful
for graph classification tasks. However, few studies have been
conducted on the robustness of these graph classification
neural network models.
In this paper, we focus on the adversarial attack on the
hierarchical GCNs for graph classification tasks. Specifically,
a new adversarial graph generating strategy with the surrogate
model is proposed. We take the-state-of-art hierarchical graph
pooling (HGP) models as instantiations of the hierarchical
GCNs and build up an adversarial attack framework to explore
the vulnerability of the HGP models to the adversarial samples.
There are three main challenges in this topic.
• How to determine an effective attack target set of nodes
and edges for the attacker? If we randomly perturb one or
a few nodes/edges, the graph classification results may not
change because such a perturbation may not influence or
destroy the graph intrinsic structure that is discriminative
for the graph classification task.
• How to design the surrogate model to generate effective
adversarial samples and fool the graph pooling neural
networks? Since there are extensive matrix multiplication
operations and non-linear components in the GNNs’ loss
function, especially in the pooling process, how to address
or avoid the high-cost issue in the computation of the
gradient of the entire loss with respect to each candidate
entry to be added/deleted is also a big challenge in
designing surrogate models.
• The robustness is always an important factor to evaluate
the performance of the models. Under the scenario of
adversarial attacks, how to improve the robustness of the
hierarchical GNNs based graph classification models?
To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a
surrogate model consisting of convolution and pooling opera-
tors. We use this surrogate model in generating the adversarial
samples to attack the target HGP models. In the meantime,
we conduct a robust train on the target models in order to
improve the robustness of these hierarchical graph pooling
neural networks. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We propose an adversarial attack framework to evaluate
the vulnerability of the hierarchical GCNs in graph clas-
sification tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work on the adversarial attack against hierarchical
GCN based graph classification models.
• We design a surrogate model that consists of convo-
lutional and pooling operators to generate adversarial
samples to fool the hierarchical GCN based graph classi-
fication models. Specifically, considering the fact that the
hierarchical pooling operators in the hierarchical GCN
classification models tend to preserve the nodes that are
more important for the graph classification (i.e., nodes
with higher scores computed in the pooling layer), we
set the preserved nodes by the pooling operator as our
attack targets, and then perturb the attack targets slightly
to fool the pooling operator in hierarchical GCNs so that
wrong nodes will be preserved.
• We use the gradient-based method to identify the can-
didate edges to be added or deleted. To simplify the
computation and reduce the cost of calculating the gra-
dient of the whole network loss with respect to each
candidate entry, we propose a new loss function based
on the pooling score function, where we try to minimize
the attack target node’s pooling score by adding/deleting
an edge connecting to the attack target node.
• We evaluate the adversarial samples generated from mul-
tiple datasets by our surrogate model and demonstrate its
superior transferability in attacking the current state-of-art
graph classification models.
• We conduct the robust train and demonstrate that the re-
trained graph classification models are capable to defend
against the attack from the adversarial samples.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some related
work will be discussed in the next section. The notations
and preliminary knowledge are given in Section III. Then
we present the proposed framework in Section IV. The
experimental results and analysis are shown in Section V,
followed by some additional evaluations in Section VI. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial machine learning work can date back to 2004,
when Dalvi et al. [34] and Lowd and Meek [35] showed
that the linear classifiers of spam filter could be easily fooled
by some elaborated modified spam emails [36]. Since then,
extensive works on adversarial attack have been done to
develop attacks against machine learning models [37], [38],
or to evaluate the robustness of the machine learning models
under the adversarial attack [39] for developing strategies to
defense the attack [40], [41]. Most of the existing works in
this area focus on image, speech and language domains, while
related studies on graphs are currently still at an early stage
[42].
Based on the attack tasks, the existing adversarial attacks
on graphs can be categorized as: node relevant attacks, edge
relevant attacks, and graph relevant attack. Node relevant
attacks usually generate adversarial samples by making an
unnoticeable perturbation on the original graphs and these
adversarial samples can disturb the node embedding [43], [44]
or node classification [25], [28]–[32] process. Likely, some
edge relevant attack works build up the attack algorithms to
disturb the node embedding process and then disturb the link
predictions [45]. So far, very few work has been done on the
graph level attack problem. In [25], Hanjun Dai et al. first
attempt to use reinforcement learning technique to address the
attack problem on graph classification models. However, since
their model is evaluated only on generated data, attacking the
model trained on the synthetic graphs may not be generalizable
to real-world graph data in various domains. And the efficiency
of using reinforcement learning (RL) method is usually a
problem too.
There are mainly two types of strategies in the graph attacks:
evasion attack, and poisoning attack. Evasion attack means
that the parameters of trained model are fixed and the attacker
tries to generate the adversarial samples from the trained fixed
model. In [25], evasion attacks are designed for both inductive
learning setting and transductive learning setting, while most
of other existing works [24], [43], [44] choose poisoning
attacks, in which attacker tries to generate the adversarial
samples on the training dataset. In this paper, we choose
evasion attacks as our strategy.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graph Notation
We consider the supervised graph classification problem on
attributed graphs with different number of nodes. Each graph
has a class label and each graph’s node has a feature vector.
Formally, let G = (A,H) be any of attributed graph with N
nodes, where A ∈ {0, 1}N×N is the adjacency matrix and H ∈
RN×D represents the N nodes’ D dimension features. (H ∈
{0, 1}N×D if the features are binarized).Since the node order
will not affect the classification and attack work, therefore,
w.l.o.g., we assign the node-ids as: i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Then
let hi ∈ {0, 1}1×D be the node i’s feature vector and L ∈
{1, 2, ..., k} be each graph’s label, where k is the number of
classes.
B. Hierarchical Graph Pooling (HGP) Model
HGP models are one kind of the state-of-art techniques to
tackle the graph classification problem [16], [22]. Given an
attribute graph G = (A,H), and its corresponding class label L,
the goal of graph classification is to learn a function f : G →
L, which can map the input graph G to the output label L.
Noted that our work is set on the inductive learning scenario,
which means the testing data never share any information in
the training process.
The HGP models are usually comprised by convolution
and pooling operations. The convolution operation aims to
project the node features into a new space in which the node
information and the relationships among nodes can be well
preserved. The pooling operation aims to preserve M(M < N)
nodes who support and encode the entire graph structure. For
the discarded nodes, their information will be aggregated into
the preserved nodes. The pooling operation effectively solves
the flatness of the previous GCN which only propagate the
information through the nodes and edges. Instead, the pooling
method can aggregate the graph information in a hierarchical
way [17].
The convolution operation in the graph pooling models
always follow the previous GCN model [10]. The only dif-
ference is that the non-linear activation function is used after
pooling. Here, the output of the (l + 1)-th convolutional layer
is defined as:
Hcov
l+1 = D˜
− 1
2
l
A˜
pool
l
D˜
− 1
2
l
H
pool
l
Wl, (1)
where A˜
pool
l
= A
pool
l
+ IN (IN is the self loop matrix). D˜l
is the degree matrix corresponding to A˜
pool
l
and H
pool
l
is the
node features propagated from the l-th pooling layer. Noted
that the adjacency matrix A changes in different convolutional
layer since the pooling layer discards some nodes. Wl is the
trainable weight parameters of layer l.
As for the pooling layer, different studies have proposed
different strategies to identify nodes to be preserved [18], [22].
Most of these studies define a score function to rank nodes
and then preserve the nodes with high score. Here, we define
a unified pooling function P as the pooling operator. Formally,
the (l + 1)-th pooling layer is:
A
pool
l+1
,H
pool
l+1
= P(Apool
l
Hcov
l+1 , θl+1) (2)
H
pool
l+1
= σ(Hpool
l+1
) (3)
where A
pool
l
is the adjacency matrix generated by the l-th
pooling layer. Hcov
l+1
is the feature vector generated by the (l +
1)-th convolution layer. θl+1 is the parameters of the (l + 1)-
th pooling layer and σ(·) is the non-linear activation function
(e.g. ReLU).
At the end of HGP model, there are a couple of linear output
layers. Here, we define a linear function g to represent the
linear layers and formalize the output y of the HGP model as:
y = so f tmax(g(Hpool
l+1
,V linear )) (4)
where V linear is the parameters of linear layers and the
output y is a probability map for each of the classes. Let
U = {W, θ,V linear } be the parameter set, the whole model
loss function can be defined using the negative log likelihood:
Lmodel(U, A, X) = − log(y[L]), (5)
where [·] is the index operation and L is the label.
C. Adversarial Attacks on Graph
Generally speaking, adversarial attack problem is a bilevel
optimization problem which includes the upper-level and
lower-level loss function. Let Gˆ = (Aˆ, Hˆ) be the adversarial
samples generated by slightly perturbing the original graph G.
For the evasion attack, the parametersU needs to be optimized
to minimize the whole model loss, Lmodel, in the model
training stage. After training, the model is fixed and then the
adversarial samples should maximize the attack loss, Lattack
given the fixed model. Formally, the graph adversarial evasion
attack problem can be depicted as:
max
Gˆ∈δ(G)
∑
j Lattack( f (Gˆ j,U∗), Lj )
s.t. U∗ = argmin
U
∑
j Lmodel( f (G j,U), Lj ), (6)
where j = 1, 2... is the graph-ids, and δ(·) defines perturbation
restrictions.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Comparing to the traditional GCN model containing only
convolution operations, the Lmodel of the HGP model is
more complicated because of nonlinear pooling operations (i.e.
network nodes cut operation and score function integration
operation, see more details in the Section 4.2) in the pooling
layer. Since the Lattack in most of existed studies is based
on or directly equals to the Lmodel, therefore, it’s difficult to
optimize the upper-level function in Eq.(6) by computing the
gradient of Lattack to graph (G) due to the complexity and
nonlinearity of the Lattack. In this work, we propose a new
solution to tackle this issue. The following section is organized
into four parts. First part describes the workflow about the
model attack and how to help the model in defending against
the attack. Second part describes a new surrogate model.
Third part explains how to generate the adversarial samples by
attacking the pooling operation in the surrogate model using a
gradient-based method. And the last part illustrates the details
of gradient computation.
Fig. 1. Adversarial Attack on the HGP Model. Red arrow represents the
adversarial samples’ generating. Green arrow is the workflow and black arrow
is the neural network propagation
A. Workflow of Adversarial Attack
We propose an evasion attack to the HGP model setting on
the inductive-learning scenario (Figure 1). The workflow of
our study can be summarized as follows:
(1) Surrogate Model Attack: We build up a hierarchical
pooling surrogate model and utilize it to generate the adver-
sarial samples. To be specific, we firstly conduct the original
train: train and test the surrogate model by using original
training and testing data. Based on the rule of inductive-
learning, testing data will never share their information in
the training process. After the surrogate model gets well-
trained, the model parameters are fixed. Then, we conduct
the adversarial samples generating: use the well-trained
surrogate model and the test data to generate the adversarial
test samples. Finally, we conduct the surrogate model attack:
use the adversarial test samples to test the surrogate model and
get the attack results on surrogate model.
(2) Target Model Attack: We firstly conduct the original
train on several existed state-of-arts HGP models (target
models). Then we use the adversarial test samples to at-
tack these target models to show the transferability of the
adversarial test samples. A good attack on target model can
manifest that the surrogate model have the ability to generate
the transferable adversarial samples.
(3) Defense Against Adversarial Samples:We conduct the
robust train on target models. The process includes using the
surrogate model to generate the adversarial train samples, and
then using these adversarial train samples to retrain the target
models. We will show the improvement of the robustness of
the target models in the experiment section.
B. Surrogate Model
The pooling layer in many existed models is not trainable.
[16], [22] The score function, for scaling the graph nodes,
is obtained by calculating some graph distance [22] or node
projection [19]. Such settings will lead to problems when we
calculate the gradient of Lattack to the graph adjacency matrix
A or to the node feature matrix H. However, Junhyun Lee et
al. [18] proposed a self-attention graph pooling model which
can parameterize the pooling layer and potentially facilitate
the gradient computation. Therefore, inspired by Lee’s work,
we propose a new surrogate model to realize the gradient
computation.
Two important characters of the surrogate model are: (1)
has the ability to classify the graph well; (2) can efficiently
generate the adversarial samples. Therefore, we propose an
HGP model with one convolution layer and one pooling layer
to be the surrogate model. At the end of pooling layer, there are
two linear fully connected layers to output graph classification
results. Following the Section 3, we formalize our surrogate
model as:
y(A0,H0) = so f tmax(sel(H1) ⊙ tanh(sel(S))V1V2) (7)
H1(A0,H0) = D˜−
1
2
0
A˜0D˜
− 1
2
0
H0W (8)
S(A0,H1) = D˜−
1
2
0
A˜0D˜
− 1
2
0
H1θ, (9)
where S is the parameterized node score function. W, θ, and
{V1,V2}
∈ V linear are the parameters in the convolution and score func-
tion and linear layers. ⊙ is the line-wise scalar multiplication.
And sel(·) is the select function to preserve the selected nodes
and discard others. i.e. If nodei is selected to be discarded, then
sel(H) will set Hi,: as 0.
For a well-trained surrogate model, the input graph data
G0 = (A0,H0) propagates through the convolution layer and
node features are encoded to a new feature space as H1. Then
H1 and A0 propagate into the pooling layer. In the pooling
layer, H1 and A0 first participate to compute the node score
function S. Then, based on the node score, the select function
sel(·) preserves the top K nodes with high scores. Finally, the
pooled feature vector will pass through the linear layers to
generate a graph classification probability. The loss function
of the model can be defined as:
Lmodel(U, A0,H0) = − log(y(A0,H0)[L]), (10)
where U = {W, θ,V linear }, L and [·] follow the previous
definitions.
C. Generating Adversarial Samples
We propose a gradient-based method to generate the adver-
sarial samples. The foremost problem to generate the adversar-
ial samples via a gradient based method is to define the attack
loss function Lattack. From Eqs (7) ∼ (10), we find that the
Lmodel is a complicated nonlinear function. Therefore, if we
directly use Lmodel as the attack loss, it will be very tedious to
solve the upper-level function in Eq. (6) via the gradient ascent
method. Therefore, unlike the existed studies [24], [32], we
design a new Lattack which can avoid computing the gradient
of nonlinear function.
1) Attack Loss Design: The most significant component
in the HGP model is the score function. A well-trained model
can utilize the score function to select the preserved nodes
which aggregate graph’s hierarchical information. Hence, if we
can generate the adversarial samples to decrease the scores of
those preserved nodes lower than those of discarded nodes, the
select function sel(·) will preserve wrong nodes and capture
the wrong hierarchical information from the graph, which
eventually lead to wrong prediction outputs. Therefore, we
formalize our Lattack as:
Lattack = S(sel(A0), sel(H1)) − S(sel(Aˆ0), sel(Hˆ0)), (11)
and the adversarial sample generating process for each graph
can be formalized as:
max
Aˆ0 ∈δ(A0 ),Hˆ0∈δ(H0)
Lattack (12)
where Aˆ0 and Hˆ0 is the adjacency matrix and node feature
vectors of adversarial samples. δ(·) is an unnoticeable pertur-
bation restriction when perturbing the original graph, which
will be explained below.
2) Unnoticeable Perturbation Restriction: Since both the
graph edges and node features can be attacked and the
perturbations must be unnoticeable, we design the following
restrictions for adjacency matrix and node feature respectively.
(1) Restriction on Graph Edge Perturbation:
Two restrictions are used to measure the graph edge pertur-
bation. We use the edit-distance [46] as the first measure and
then set a budget △1 to restrict the edit-distance between A0
and Aˆ0. Formally,
δ1(A0, Aˆ0) = |A0−Aˆ0 |N2 ≤ △1 (13)
For the other restriction, we use the 2nd order DELTACON0
graph distance [47] to capture the graph differences on the
2nd order level. Then we set another budget △2 to restrict the
second order DELTACON0 graph distance between A0 and
Aˆ0. Formally,
δ2(A0, Aˆ0) =
√
(S0 − Sˆ0)2
=
√√ N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(√s0,ij −
√
sˆ0,ij )2 ≤ △2
S0 ≈ I + ǫA0 + ǫ2A0,
Sˆ0 ≈ I + ǫ Aˆ0 + ǫ2 Aˆ0 (14)
(2) Restriction on Node Feature Perturbation:
An l1 norm is used to measure the perturbation on the
node feature vectors. We set up a budget △3 to restrict the
perturbation between H0 and Hˆ0. Formally,
δ3(H0, Hˆ0) =| | H0 − Hˆ0 | |1≤ △3 (15)
Algorithm 1: Generating Adversarial Samples
input : G = (A0,H0), restriction, △ = {△1,△2,△3}, graph label:
CL ,K , N(number of Nodes)
output: Gˆ = (Aˆ, Hˆ)
Train surrogate model:
U∗ ← min
U
Lmodel(U, A,H) // U = {W, θ,V linear }
Fix model and generate adversarial samples
while δ(G, Gˆ) ≤ △ do
for Top K nodes do
for j = 1, 2, ..., N do
Compute: ∇ai, j = ∂(S(A0,H0)i−S(A,H )i )∂ai j
end
Find: (i, j) ← max
(i, j)
∇ai, j
if ai, j = 0&∇ai, j > 0 OR ai, j = 1&∇ai, j < 0 then
Add/Delete ai, j // ∇ai, j > 0, Add; else, Delete
else
Delete ∇ai, j and Return Find;
end
Compute: ∇hi = ∂(S(A0,H0)i−S(A,H )i )∂hi
hˆi ← hi + ∇hi
end
end
3) Gradient-Based Pooling Attack Algorithm: After the
whole graph pooling model getting trained, all the model
parameters are fixed. Then, we will generate the adversarial
samples by our gradient-based pooling attack algorithm. Noted
that ai, j is the element in A0 at (i, j) and hi is the i-th line of
H. For the selected top K nodes, we compute the gradient of
Lattack to each node feature and edge. i.e. If nodei is selected,
we will compute ∇hi(Lattack) and ∇aij (Lattack) for each
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Then we select the largest | ∇aij (Lattack) |
and add/delete the edge at ai, j (Add the edge if the gradient
is positive, otherwise, delete the edge). Also, we will update
the hi to (hi + ∇hi(Lattack)).
Notice that there are some special cases when perturbing the
edge. At the largest gradient position (i, j), if we will delete
an edge but ai, j = 0, or, if we will add an edge but ai, j = 1. If
these special cases happen, we will search for the 2nd largest
gradient position. Such a process will continue until the special
cases do not exist. We will conduct the above process from
the Top 1 node to the Top K node, unless the perturbation
restriction breaks. The details of the algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1
D. Computation of Attack Gradient
In this part, will show how to compute the gradient of
Lattack to adjacency matrix A(self-looped) and node feature
H. w.r.t. each selected node. WLOG, we assume that nodei is
selected by the select function and become our attack target.
Then the problems can be defined as follows:
problem 1. Let G0 = (A0,H0) be the original graph, compute
the
∂(S(A0,H0)i−S(A,H )i )
∂ai j
for j = {1, 2, ..., N}. Here aij is the element
in A at (i, j) and S(·) is defined in Eq.(9).
For the convenience, we first give some matrix definitions.
Let D = D˜−
1
2 be the diagonal matrix with each element as
d˜ii
− 1
2 . The assist degree matrix Dˇ is defined as:
Dˇ =

d11
d22
.
.
.
dNN


d11
d22
.
.
.
dNN

T
=

d
2
11 d11d22 · · · d11dNN
d22d11 d
2
22 · · · d22dNN
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
dNN d11 dNN d22 · · · d
2
NN

(16)
where (·)T is the matrix transpose.
theorem 1. For each j = {1, 2, ..., N}, The partial derivative
in PROBLEM 1. is:
∂(S(A0,H0)i − S(A,H)i)
∂aij
= −θT [diid j j (KHW)T + M],
K = Dˇlinej ◦ Alinej ,
M = aiid
2
ii(diid j jHlinejW)T (17)
where H ∈ RN×D , W ∈ RD×F and θ ∈ RF×1 follow the
previous definition, ◦ is the element-wise product.
Proof. In the partial derivative in PROBLEM 1, we find
the first term (S(A0,H0)i − S(A,H)i) is a constant which is
unrelated to the gradient computing. So we only need to check
the second term. Show that:
−S(A,H)i = −[(Dˇlinei ◦ Alinei )(A ◦ DˇHW)]θ (18)
Then we can expand − ∂(S(A,H )i )
∂ai j
for ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} as:
−∂(S(A,H)i)
∂aij
= −( θ1(diid j j [X1] + [Z1]) +
θ2(diid j j [X2] + [Z2]) +
· · · · · ·
θF (diid j j [XF ] + [ZF ])). (19)
where,

X1
X1
.
.
.
XF

= ([aj1d j jd11, · · · , aj jd j jd j j, · · · , ajN d j jdNN ] HW)T
= (Dˇlinej ◦ Alinej HW)T (20)

Z1
Z2
...
ZF

= aiid
2
ii(diid j j
[
hi1hi2 · · · hiD
]
W)T
= aiid
2
ii(diid j jHlinejW)T , (21)
Concluded from Eqs.(19)∼(21), Eq.(17) is proved. 
problem 2. Let G0 = (A0,H0) be the original graph, compute
the
∂(S(A0,H0)i−S(A,H )i )
∂hi
. Here hi is the i-th line of H which repre-
sents the feature of nodei and S(·) is defined in Eq.(9)
For the convenience, we define another assist degree matrix
Dˇ2 = Dˇ ◦ Dˇ as:
Dˇ2 =
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theorem 2. The partial derivative in PROBLEM 2. is:
∂(S(A0,H0)i − S(A,H)i)
∂hi
= −(Dˇ2
linei
(AT
linei
◦ Acoli ) ⊙W)θ, (23)
where W ∈ RD×F , θ ∈ RF×1 and ◦ follow the previous
definition.
Proof. In the partial derivative in PROBLEM 2, only the
second term −S(A,H)i is related to the gradient computing.
So we only need to check the second term and show that:
− ∂(S(A,H)i)
∂hi
= (
[
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]
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⊙W)θ
= (Dˇ2
linei
(AT
linei
◦ Acoli ) ⊙W)θ (24)
Therefore, Eq.(23) is proved. 
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section is organized into six parts. (A) data description;
(B) adversarial samples generating and surrogate model attack;
(C) the transferability of adversarial samples; (D) power
analysis of the attack; (E) the feature attack vs. the edge attack;
and (F) the robustness and model defending.
A. Dataset
Six graph datasets are selected from the well-known Bench-
mark Data Sets for Graph Kernels [48]. DD dataset contains
graphs of protein crystal structures. The graph label indicates
if the protein is enzyme or not [49].Mutagenicity dataset con-
tains graphs of chemistry molecular structure. The graph label
indicates the Mutagenicity of the molecular [50]. ER MD,
BZR and DHFR contain graphs to represent the chemical
bond type. [51], [52]. And AIDS dataset contains biological
graphs to represent the antiviral character of different biology
compounds [53]. Details of dataset are summarized in Table
1.
TABLE I
DATASET STATISTICS
Dataset # of Graphs # of Classes Avg. # of Edges
DD 1178 2 715.66
Mutagenicity 4337 2 30.77
ER MD 446 2 234.85
DHFR 467 2 44.54
AIDS 2000 2 16.2
BZR 405 2 38.36
B. Surrogate Model Attack
1) Experiment Setting: Since our attack model is set on
an inductive learning scenario, we first split each dataset into
80% training, 10% validation and 10% testing subsets. We
conduct the attack experiments on our surrogate model in 3
steps. Firstly, we conduct the original train to show that our
surrogate model can well classify the original samples in a
hierarchical way. To be specific, we train the surrogate model
on training data and evaluate the model on validation data
after each epoch. The best trained model is saved and tested
on testing data. Secondly, we generate the adversarial test
samples from the fixed well trained model based on our attack
method. The perturbation restrictions are set as: △1 = 0.05 and
△2 = 0.25 (ǫ = 0.0001) which will hold the similarity between
original and adversarial samples larger than 80%. And K is
set as 50%. In this step, we only perturb 5% nodes and show
that the attack performance is quite remarkable. Thirdly, we
attack the surrogate model on adversarial test samples.
2) Surrogate Model Attack: Results of the original train
and adversarial attack (with 5% nodes perturbation) on surro-
gate model are shown in Table 2. The results of the original
train show that our proposed surrogate model achieves a good
classification performance (comparable to [18], [22]). The
results of adversarial attack show that our surrogate model can
efficiently generate powerful adversarial samples which can
impair the model’s classification ability by perturbing a very
few edges. Comparing to the results of original train, the clas-
sification accuracies are reduced by 35.49%, 33.86%, 9.46%,
10.91%, 27.69%, 9.10% for DD, Mutagenicity, ER MD,
DHFR, AIDS and BZR data after attack.
TABLE II
ORIGINAL TRAIN V.S. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Dataset Original Train Adversarial Attack
DD 76.84% 49.57%
Mutagenicity 74.02% 48.96%
ER MD 76.09% 68.89%
DHFR 71.43% 63.64%
AIDS 97.50% 70.50%
BZR 82.50% 75.00%
C. Transferability of the Adversarial Samples
1) Experiment Setting: We adopt two recent state-of-art
HGP models, HGP-SL [22] and SAG [18] as our target
models. The training and validation data are used to conduct
TABLE III
TRANSFERABILITY OF ADV. SAMPLES ON TARGET MODELS
Dataset SAG HGP-SL
Orig. Train Attack Baseline Orig. Train Attack Baseline
DD 75.95% 55.42% 64.41% 79.98% 57.14% 66.10%
Mutagenicity 76.32% 43.34% 66.35% 81.61% 61.84% 73.33%
ER MD 70.56% 47.80% 60.00% 78.26% 50.00% 62.22%
DHFR 72.73% 63.64% 68.09% 75.32% 63.64% 68.09%
AIDS 95.50% 89.00% 93% 98.50% 78.50% 92.50%
BZR 87.50% 85.00% 85.00% 90.00% 82.50% 87.50%
the original train using these two models and the testing data
are used to show the performances of original trains. Then,
following the rule of evasion attack, we use the generated
adversarial test samples to attack these two target models.
Meanwhile, for each dataset, we set up a baseline method
as randomly attack 5% selected nodes.
2) Transferability of Adversarial Samples: The results of
the original train and adversarial attack on HGP-SL and SAG
models are shown in Table 3. We reproduce the previous
work and obtain a similar test accuracy in the original train.
The attack results manifest that the adversarial samples are
transferable to attack different HGP models. This is because
the attack method successfully perturb the very few nodes
which support the hierarchical structure of the graph. In other
words, the adversarial samples represent different latent and
intrinsic hierarchical structure information from the original
samples although they look very similar. Thus, no matter
what HGP model will capture different hierarchical structure
information from adversarial or original data, thereby output
a total different classification.
D. Attack Power Analysis
1) Experiment Setting: Attack Power is quantified by the
percentages of perturbed edges. We generate the adversarial
test samples by perturbing different percentages of edges.
Consider that too many edges perturbations will break the
unnoticeable restriction, therefore we set the max perturbation
on each graph as perturbing 25% of edges. For ER MD,
and DD dataset, we cannot reach 25% edge perturbation
because even if we attack all top K nodes, the perturbed edges
percentage is still less than 25%. For these two dataset, we set
the max perturbation as perturbing all selected top K nodes.
All the above processes are conducted under the unnoticeable
restriction.
2) Attack Power Analysis: The tendency of attack power is
shown in the Figure 2. On the one hand, Figure 2 shows that
the adversarial attacks on both models become more powerful
with the increase of the perturbation edges or more attack
strength. On the other hand, it also shows that the attack power
rapidly increases at the beginning of the attack when around
5% edges are perturbed. Then, the attack power hardly in-
creases whereas more edges are perturbed. This is because, at
the beginning of the attack, the attack model perturbs very few
important edges which hold the graph hierarchical structure.
After these important nodes are attacked, other nodes are so
0 5 10 15 20 25
Edge Perturbation (%)
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
Different Attack Power on SAG Model
DD
Mutagenicity
ER-MD
BZR
DHFR
AIDS
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25
Edge Perturbation (%)
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
Different Attack Power on HGP-SL Model
DD
Mutagenicity
ER-MD
BZR
DHFR
AIDS
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) shows the adversarial attack on SAG model under different attack
strengths. (b) shows the adversarial attack on HGP-SL model under different
attack strengths. Horizontal axis is edge perturbation percentage and vertical
axis is classification accuracy
trivial that have little contribution to holding the hierarchical
structure of the graph. Thereby the perturbations on these
trivial nodes will not enhance the attack consequences. Also,
this results demonstrate that a small number of nodes contains
the key information on the hierarchical structure of the whole
graph.
E. Feature Attack v.s. Edge Attack
1) Experiment Setting: Two dataset AIDS and BZR which
include specific node features are selected to conduct this
experiment. When generating the adversarial samples on node
features, we set the unnoticeable restriction △3 = 0.05. We
first conduct the feature attack on two target models using
perturbed features and original edges. Then we combine the
features attack and edges attack together.
2) Feature Attack v.s. Edges Attack: Figure 3. shows
that both node feature attack and edges attack can reduce the
performance of the target models and edges attack is more
powerful than the node feature attack. This is because the
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Fig. 3. Node Feature Attack v.s. Edge Attack v.s. Combined Attack on AIDS
(a) and BZR dataset (b). Large error rate represents powerful attack. Hori-
zontal axis is edge perturbation percentage and vertical axis is classification
error rate
perturbation on edge is discretely adding/deleting the edge,
which will produce more errors than feature perturbations. The
combined attack shows the most powerful attack on both target
models across different dataset.
F. Robust Train
The goal of robust train is to improve the robustness of
the target models to the adversarial samples with a small
performance sacrifice.
1) Experiment Setting: Firstly, we generate the adversarial
training/validation samples. Then we mix the original and
adversarial training data together to re-train the target models.
The training process follows the original train in Section 5.2.
After the models are re-trained, we use adversarial test data
to test the robustness of the re-trained model (Robust Test).
We conduct the robust train based on DD and Mutagenicity
dataset and retrain the model by using adversarial training data
generated under different attack power.
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Fig. 4. Show the robust train results on (a) DD dataset and (b) Mutagenicity
dataset across two target models. Horizontal axis is edge perturbation per-
centage and vertical axis is classification accuracy
2) Robust Train Analysis: Figure 4 shows the robust
test on mixed (Original+Adversarial) samples as well as
on Adversarial samples. The performance of the robust-
trained models on the adversarial samples (pink line) shows
a significant robustness improvement in compared with the
performance of the original models on adversarial samples
(black line). Moreover, the robust test on mixed samples (blue
line) indicates the re-trained models has very few performance
budget comparing to original models(red line).
VI. EVALUATION
The basic idea for our attack model is generating adversarial
samples to attack the hierarchical structure of the original
graphs by making an ”unnoticeable” perturbation. Therefore,
we firstly evaluate the perturbation between adversarial and
original samples. Then, we show how the hierarchical structure
is affected under the attack. To show the perturbation between
original and adversarial samples, we compute the node degree
distribution for each original and adversarial samples. Then
we calculate the mean Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [54]
between each pairs of node degree distributions (Table 4).
The lower value of mean KL divergence indicates the smaller
difference between original and adversarial samples.
TABLE IV
EVALUATION
Dataset KL divergence(std.) CL(p-value) GRC(p-value)
DD 7.60e-3(3.49e-2) 3.71e-6 1.77e-5
Mutagenicity 5.11e-2(6.11e-2) 2.53e-9 1.50e-3
ER MD 1.05e-6(3.02e-9) 1.11e-3 6.00e-4
DHFR 4.99e-2(2.10e-2) 4.41e-10 8.27e-20
AIDS 4.64e-2(1.40e-1) 3.11e-3 7.01e-6
BZR 7.68e-2(2.09e-2) 4.95e-10 3.97e-8
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Fig. 5. (a). Original sample’s node distribution v.s. Adversarial sample’s node
distribution. horizontal coordinate is the node degree and vertical coordinate
is frequency (b). Original sample’s modularity v.s. Adversarial sample’s
modularity.
In order to evaluate the attack on the graph hierarchical
structure, two popular measures, Global-Reaching-Centrality
(GRC) [55] and community-louvain (CL) [56], are extracted
for each original and adversarial sample. Then we conduct a
student T test for each measure between the original sample
and adversarial sample. All the p-values (Table 4) are less
than 0.05, indicating a significant difference in the hierarchical
structure between the original and adversarial samples. Figure
5 demonstrates an example (a DD data) of node degree
distribution and hierarchical structure for both original and
adversarial samples.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new adversarial attack frame-
work to evaluate the robustness of the HGP models in graph
classification tasks. Also, we conduct the robust train to help
these graph pooling models to improve their robustness under
the attack of the adversarial samples. However, the HGP model
in our study is only one type of GCN-based methods. There
are many other types of whole graph embedding methods
whose robustness are still not be verified. One of our future
work will focus on some more generalized adversarial attack
strategies to evaluate the robustness of other graph classifica-
tion models (such as graph kernel models, topology methods,
etc.). Moreover, some of the questions in the task of graph
adversarial attack are not well defined. For example, unlike
the adversarial attack on image tasks, there is hardly any
uniformed criterion to measure the ”unnoticeable” perturbation
between the original and perturbed graph. Therefore, it is
also necessary to investigate some more convinced criterion to
quantify ’unnoticeable perturbations. Lastly, the discrete opti-
mization method should always be considered when generating
the adversarial samples. How to build up a better optimization
algorithm to deal with the discrete problem (e.g. continuous
relaxation) will also be included in our future work.
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